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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this research is to identify key factors that impact the probability 
of success of a military material acquisition program. These key factors are intended to 
be incorporated in a wargaming-type acquisition game developed by the U.S. Army 
Engineer Research and Development Center. This project defines a successful military 
acquisition as a program that achieves a successful Milestone C decision and is not 
terminated or restructured. Measures of potential factors related to program cost, 
schedule, and performance were postulated and potential data sources identified. Data 
were drawn from Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress. Statistical analysis 
was conducted using data from 79 DOD ACAT I programs to determine correlations of 
initial program baseline cost, schedule, and performance data. Analysis determined 
that the percentage of a program’s Key Performance Parameters that achieve their 
threshold values is the strongest indicator of a program achieving a successful 
Milestone C decision. The output of this capstone is a methodology that can be adapted 
for application in evaluating probability of successful military acquisitions in other 
countries or to incorporate stronger leading indicators of program success if data 
become available for analysis. Recommendations for further analysis and data 
collection efforts include categorizing programs based on the urgency of need, as well 
as the system’s technology readiness levels at program initiation. 
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The process of acquiring equipment and services for military applications is a 
complex process that involves substantial risk for the service or country executing the 
acquisition. Variables such as available funding resources, personnel, time to acquire, 
technology advancements, and system performance can impact the success or failure of an 
acquisition program. The consequences of unsuccessful acquisitions include lost time, 
wasted money, and unachieved capability that can be costly or even catastrophic. The 
acquisition process follows a general order of events (identifying a need, determining a 
solution to address the need, and producing the solution that fulfils the need), one might 
hypothesize that there are certain conditions or variables that can indicate whether an 
acquisition will be successful or not.  
The U.S. Army Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC) undertook 
development of a table-top game to enable better understanding of the vulnerabilities of an 
acquisition by evaluating the impacts of human decision-making paired with the type of 
product acquired, the process in which the product is acquired, and the external context 
factors that are a result of the acquisition process. The use of a game as the medium allows 
for random variables, not chosen by the players, to be injected into the gameplay which 
forces a decision to be made, based on the situation. For variables in the game to have 
validity, however, ERDC needed to understand what variables impact the success of an 
acquisition as well as the magnitude of the impact of the chosen variables. 
This capstone project analyzed data from historical, U.S. Department of Defense 
major acquisition programs with the objective of determining what variables should be 
gamified to influence the development of a potentially successful acquisition strategy and 
what metrics need to be achieved to increase the probability of achieving success. To 
accomplish this objective, the team first established a baseline definition of a successful 
program as one that received a favorable decision at Milestone (MS) C and was not 
terminated or transitioned. Program data from the Defense Acquisition Visibility 
Environment (DAVE), Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE), and Defense 
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) websites was used to conduct 
xvi 
quantitative analysis. Statistical methods including hypothesis testing, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), and linear regression were applied to the data to determine the best leading 
indicators of program success. The interactions between these leading indicators were 
explored by conducting two-factor ANOVAs. The factors that were shown to be significant 
were then used to create a predictive model, which was tested by conducting cross 
validation using an 80/20 split.  
The result of our analysis was the development of a useful measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) for program success, which was the ratio of Key Performance Parameters (KPP) 
that met their threshold values. Three significant factors were shown empirically to impact 
the MOE – whether a program was joint or not, the program’s lead service, and the system 
type that was being acquired. The MOE and its related factors were used to construct a 
baseline predictive model capable of estimating a program’s ratio of KPPs that will achieve 
the threshold value. This MOE was analytically shown throughout our research to be a 
statistically significant data point in a program’s success or failure. By building the 
predictive model, the team identified an eight-step methodology that can be used to study 
other potential factors that might be incorporated to improve on this initial model. The 
steps that have been documented in this analysis provide a map for incorporating new 
factors, new data sets, and new MOEs for success within military acquisitions. 
While the capstone team accomplished our primary objectives for the project, the 
team also identified areas for future research and noted challenges associated with this 
project. Data collection represented the greatest challenge and will inevitably play a role 
in future research involving the acquisition process. Due to the limitations of the data 
available in CADE, DAVE and DAMIR, the team was unable to include factors that they 
anticipated to have a significant impact on a program’s success such as the initial 
technology readiness level (TRL) or urgency of need for the system. Future research could 
build upon this methodology to explore additional factors that could also influence success. 
A robust effort to collect relevant data will be required to support future research on this 
topic. Data collection could be significantly improved if additional information is 
categorized and included on the annual Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress.   
xvii 
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Military acquisition (MA) is a complex process, requiring a nation to balance their 
funding, security strategy, technology maturity, and other variables in pursuit of desired 
capabilities. The U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) is 
currently developing a table-top game to evaluate how process, product, and context (PPC) 
impact the success of MAs with respect to cost, schedule, and performance. The ERDC 
recognizes the difficulty in modeling and simulating complex systems in which humans 
play a role (Ruvinsky et al. 2021). They choose a game media, as games simplify these 
complex processes. ERDC defined process, product, and context as the following: 
1. “The product dimension defines the object of interest that is desired from 
the acquisition process to include definitions of the functions the military 
system will perform”  
2. “The process dimension serves to deliver the military system specified by 
the product dimension”  
3. “The context dimension includes any factors external to the process and 
product dimensions that affect a nation’s ability to acquire a new military 
system. Factors from the context dimension act upon the process 
dimension, thus slowing or hastening a nation’s ability to acquire.” 
(Ruvinsky et al. 2021) 
An examination of specific country data by ERDC was used to extrapolate a 
framework for studying the effects of PPC on the success of MAs. To facilitate the 
transition from an understanding of a real-world acquisitions domain space to a gamified 
table-top simulation, ERDC required a model to facilitate the identification of (1) relevant 
objects, entities, and concepts, (2) the actions that may be taken, and (3) the impact of 
actions on the possibility space of the simulated game. ERDC also created a system 
dynamics model (Figure 1) depicting the interactions of context variables.  
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 System Dynamics Model Depicting Context Variables 
Interactions. Source: Ruvinsky et al. (2021). 
Additionally, ERDC created a framework of context variables (Figure 2) organized 
by three primary routes of acquisition—commercial off the shelf, research and 
development, and technology transfer. 
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 Detailed Framework of Acquisition Context Organized by the 
Three Primary Routes of Acquisition. Source: Ruvinsky et al. (2021). 
Ultimately, the developed framework will be used with game theory to create and 
play acquisition games under instances of PPC, thus allowing for the creation of data points 
beyond historical cases. The game and results will be used by acquisitions research analysts 
to better understand and explore acquisition capabilities of various nation-states. This 
capstone project required the team conduct research on historical MAs, analyze factors 
concerning PPC, conduct a quantitative analysis of variables, and provide ERDC with an 
improved success-failure framework to augment future gameplay scenarios in follow on 
iterations of the game.  
B. PROJECT PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research project is not to create game elements for ERDC’s 
effort, but to investigate the influence of PPC on historical MA initiatives to assist ERDC 
in development of their gaming process. The capstone project will accomplish the 
following objectives to meet the purpose: 
1. Define program success and develop measures of effectiveness for our 
definition.  
2. Identify common PPC factors impacting MA. 
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3. Conduct a quantitative analysis of the data elicited from historical MAs. 
4. Identify the factors that contribute to successful or unsuccessful MAs. 
5. Construct a predictive model for incorporation in ERDC’s game. 
C. PROJECT APPROACH 
The ERDC’s system of interest is a table-top game, with the goal of evaluating how 
aspects of PPC impact the success of MAs. ERDC provided products defining PPC and a 
framework of their defined variables. The scope of this capstone project included an 
analysis of historical MAs in the United States military to provide increased realism for 
ERDC’s game by quantifying their steps to a successful acquisition process. Our capstone 
team developed a definition for a successful acquisition, developed useful measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) tied to our definition of success, conducted an analysis of factors 
concerning PPC, conducted research on historical MA’s, conducted quantitative analysis 
of context variables, and identified a methodology for further study of PPC that will 
enhance ERDC’s gamification efforts and improve their framework for gameplay 
scenarios. The process carried out here also provides a format for analyzing other nations’ 
acquisition processes and will provide for expansion of ERDC’s table-top game.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Our primary research question was: What measurable factors in MAs can be used 
to quantify the probability of a successful acquisition strategy and then be used as an input 
to ERDC’s gamification efforts? 
In addition, the team identified three supplementary research questions: 
1. How is MA success defined in terms of cost, schedule, and performance? 
2. How can context be used as a gamification input in MAs? 
3. How do context variables correlate with MA success measures?  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. GAMIFICATION 
1. What is Gamification? 
The use of games and gameful experiences in everyday situations has risen 
tremendously over the last few decades. Video games can be found in many facets of our 
lives, from Xbox and PlayStation consoles in living rooms and bedrooms to game 
applications on our cell phones. Our youth are exposed to gaming environments almost as 
soon as they can focus on a screen with educational programs taking advantage of the 
medium. Games provide a user engagement experience that other sectors, such and 
education and industry, can employ to engage students and workers more deeply in other 
life activities, thus “gamifying” ideas and technology was born. 
The terms “gamification” or “gamifying” have definitions that vary widely amongst 
scholarly articles and various works, with disagreements over the interpretations and 
oversimplification of the meanings and context of the terms. In fact, there have been at 
least three published works (Deterding 2011; Werbach 2014; Huotari and Hamari 2017) 
dedicated solely to defining the term(s) alone from 2011–2017. Deterding et al. surveyed 
existing published research on the subject to produce an accepted definition of 
“gamification” and produced the following: “the use of design elements characteristic for 
games in non-game contexts” (Deterding et al. 2011). Werbach more simply defined 
gamification as “the process of making activities more game-like” (Werbach 2014). 
Huotari and Hamari (2017) defined the term through the lens of service marketing as “a 
process of enhancing a service with affordances for gameful experiences in order to support 
users’ overall value creation.”  The definition produced by Deterding et al. best fit our 
sponsor’s objectives of and framed the way our team approached this capstone project. 
2. Where is Gamification Most Commonly Used? 
A 2014 review by Hamari, Koivisto, and Sarsa of 24 empirical studies showed that 
9 of the 24 gamification contexts were geared towards education or learning. The second 
and third most common contexts were Intra-Organizational Systems and Work, each with 
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four studies (Hamari, Koivisto, and Sarsa 2014). An example of this type of educational 
context would be the ABCMouse application that is designed to teach educational 
foundations to children between the ages of two and eight years old. Kids earn tickets by 
completing activities such as tracing letters or counting and can then buy items in the game 
such as pets or accessories for their avatar. This application aligns with Kapp’s statements 
(2014) that educational gamification differs from learning games that have a defined start 
and finish. Educational gamification is delivered in short increments to a learner’s mobile 
device and uses game elements as rewards for completing lessons.  
In a work setting, gamification has been used in Information Systems development 
to motivate the users, or employees of companies. Fernandez et al. (2012) discusses a web-
based program for conducting collaborative requirements elicitation that is called “iThink.”  
The program presents the requirement generation process as a game in which players are 
rewarded for generating and analyzing new and existing requirements. iThink engages its 
users by awarding points for various aspects of the requirements generation process, with 
the hardest tasks being awarded the most points. All the requirements generation team 
members can see their ranking amongst their contemporaries to generate a competitive 
environment. 
Games can help simplify complex systems, such as system acquisition, for 
analyses. “Beer Game,” developed at the Massachusetts’s Institute of Technology’s Sloan 
School of Business in the 1960s, simplified the management of a beer supply chain by 
identifying significant variables and ignoring the rest for gameplay (Sterman 1992). 
Significant variables are elements of the system that have the greatest impact on success or 
failure. We will follow a similar process in support of the acquisition game for ERDC. 
3. Why is Gamification Effective for Motivation? 
The source of the effectiveness of gamification is another broadly defined and often 
debated topic. What motivates one person is often vastly different from the next, but there 
are common psychological factors that motivate most humans. Research into motivation 
(Astleitner 2000) has identified six principal perspectives that are “relevant in the context 
of gamification: the trait perspective, the behaviorist learning perspective, the cognitive 
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perspective, the perspective of self-determination, the perspective of interest, and the 
perspective of emotion.” Of these perspectives, the self-determination perspective 
encompasses a broad range of motivational mechanisms that have already been 
successfully applied in the context of games (Sailer et al. 2017). “Within self-determination 
theory, three basic psychological and intrinsic needs are postulated: the need for 
competence, the need for autonomy, and the need for social relatedness” (Ryan and Deci 
2002). According to Sailer et al. (2017): 
1. The need for competence refers to the desire to gain skills and master 
tasks that are relevant to a person’s environment. When people feel they 
have achieved a mastery of their required skills, they are more likely to set 
out and achieve their goals. 
2. The need for autonomy refers to doing something not because you are told 
to do it, but because you want to do it. This allows for the sense of choice 
and when the choice belongs to the person executing, they have more “buy 
in” to the decision.  
3. The need for social relatedness refers to a person’s need to have a sense of 
belonging to or contributing to a group.  
When gamifying something, a process, operation, or activity for example, Sailer et 
al. (2017) identified seven typical game design elements that can be related to the 
psychological needs above: (1) points, (2) badges, (3) leader boards, (4) performance 
graphs, (5) meaningful stories, (6) avatars and (7) teammates (Sailer et al. 2017). Sailer et 
al. (2013) and Hence et al. (2014) found the “need for competence can be addressed by 
points, performance graphs, badges, or leaderboards.”  Points provide feedback to the 
player that lets them know their actions were correct; performance graphs provide feedback 
over a period of time; badges and/or leaderboards let the player know how their progress 
compares to others (Rigby and Ryan 2011). The feedback function of these game design 
elements makes the player feel competent, as they let the player know if their actions were 
successful or not. 
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Meaningful stories and avatars are game design elements that address the need for 
autonomy. Whether a game is a first-person shooter, an action-adventure, or a sandbox 
genre, a meaningful story helps players experience their decisions and the actions that 
result from those choices. In some games, the player can choose an avatar or character to 
represent themselves however they like. This freedom of choice fulfils another aspect of 
the need for autonomy. 
The elements of teammates and meaningful stories address the need for social 
relatedness. “Together with teammates, who can be real co-players or nonplayer characters, 
a sense of relevance can be evoked by emphasizing the importance of the players’ actions 
for the group’s performance. A shared goal, which can be conveyed within a meaningful 
story, can also foster experiences of social relatedness” (Sailer et al. 2017). 
B. ACQUISITION CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Characteristics of Terminated Acquisition Programs 
To effectively identify the critical factors that impact Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAP), it is important to conduct a retrospective review of failed programs in 
addition to identifying the characteristics of successful programs. Many researchers have 
attempted to identify factors that contribute to failed programs. In many cases, failed 
programs offer an opportunity to conduct a post-mortem in attempts to codify lessons 
learned, identify what successes came out of a program, and what factors led to failure. 
In addition to cost, schedule, and performance, researchers have identified other 
areas that ultimately influence a program’s fate. Some of these factors include the project 
management team, contracts, planning attributes, the stakeholder environment, risk 
mitigation, communication, technology readiness level (TRL), and contractor (Clowney, 
Dever, and Stuban 2016). Our research delves into multiple failed acquisition programs to 
identify common threads between prior research and case studies to attempt to find viable 
gamification inputs. To establish some root causes of failure in MDAPs, we examine three 
well known failures: Future Combat Systems (FCS), Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), 
and Comanche Helicopter. FCS, JTRS, and Comanche helicopter were three failed MDAPs 
undertaken by the U.S. Army, costing an estimated combined total of $35.9B before these 
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programs were ultimately cancelled and deemed failures (Clowney, Dever, and Stuban 
2016).  
The FCS was the most ambitious program ever undertaken in Army acquisitions, 
and consisted of 18 systems including manned and unmanned systems, munitions, and 
sensors all connected via a wireless network (Pernin 2012). The program was planned to 
cost approximately $200B and was envisioned to change the way that the Army fights 
future wars (Pernin 2012). The robust nature of the FCS program and the program’s 
massive budget led to significant congressional oversight throughout the program’s life. 
Numerous Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports examined the program at 
various stages of its life cycle. In 2008, a GAO report found that requirements definition 
was still fluid, critical technologies were immature, software development was still in its 
early stages, and many complementary programs were exhibiting schedule risk (Francis 
2008). Cost, schedule, and performance risks were expected issues in failed programs, but 
the other findings were interesting and worth exploring in other major failed MDAPs. The 
issues found in the 2008 GAO report ultimately contributed to the program’s cancellation 
in 2009; however, some initiatives continued as follow-on programs (Pernin 2012). 
A second major acquisition failure was the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). 
JTRS was a transformational communications network planned to allow warfighters and 
support personnel to transmit a wide variety of data across a wireless network (Gansler 
2012). The JTRS program was ultimately cancelled in 2011, failing to deliver the required 
capability to the warfighter. A GAO report from 2003, while the JTRS program was 
ongoing, identified several major issues and challenges. Radios for air and ground 
platforms were allowed to proceed into the Systems Development and Demonstration 
phase without meeting recommended TRLs (GAO 2003). Additionally, other technologies 
including miniaturized components were found to be immature and likely to push the 
program off schedule by a year or more (GAO 2003). 
A 2003 GAO report noted challenges with the JTRS program and estimated that 
250,000 JTRS radios were expected to cost $14.4B (GAO 2003). As the program continued 
and problems mounted, the cost of the program continued to balloon. By 2011, it was 
estimated that 194,000 JTRS radios would cost more than $23B, which ultimately 
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contributed to the program’s cancellation (Gansler 2012). This program is another example 
of ill-defined requirements, changing customer needs, and immature technology playing a 
significant role in the decision to cancel the program without getting the required capability 
to the warfighter.  
Problems were identified and addressed throughout development of the JTRS. The 
program was a high visibility program that aimed to transform communications. As such, 
the program received significant management attention (Porter et al. 2009). The JTRS-
Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) did not have a MS A review, rather decision makers held 
the general belief that the technology was ready to advance (Porter et al. 2009). A final 
factor in the failure of the JTRS program was continued advancement despite concerns 
with TRLs. JTRS-GMR passed MS B without any of its 20 critical technologies reaching 
TRL 6 and several below TRL 4 (Porter et al. 2009).  
The Army’s modernization program to field an advanced helicopter, the Comanche, 
is another well-known program worth examining. The RAH-66 Comanche Scout/Attack 
helicopter is an interesting case study because it was terminated by the Army itself instead 
of Congress or Department of Defense (DOD) oversight (Demotes-Mainard 2012). The 
Comanche program existed in development for 20 years. The program started as the focus 
of Army modernization at the end of the Cold War, however over time it transitioned from 
the number one modernization priority to a termination that occurred without serious 
opposition (Demotes-Mainard 2012). 
The Comanche program consumed $6.9B over 20 years and included sensor 
integration, increased agility, and low-observable technology that surpasses anything in the 
inventory today (Demotes-Mainard 2012). The factors that led to the cancellation of the 
Comanche program vary greatly from the programs previously discussed. While the 
previous programs were cancelled by Congress and DOD oversight, this program was 
terminated from within for a variety of reasons.  
The Comanche program was initiated in a time where stealth technology was 
thought to be of the utmost importance, particularly due to the ongoing Cold War 
(Demotes-Mainard 2012). The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in a 
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dissolution of the consensus between the DOD and the Army on the need for such an 
aircraft (Demotes-Mainard 2012). With the Soviet threat diminished, changes to the 
concepts of future war, and pressure to rationalize the budget, the program began to lose 
favor, ultimately resulting in its cancellation because the capability was determined to no 
longer be needed. This is an example of how major programs that include long lead times 
can be affected by the constantly evolving threat environment.  
Numerous studies have been conducted to identify factors that contributed to a 
program’s failure. These studies have varied in size and scope, with some focusing on 
MDAPs and others taking broad view of defense acquisitions. Software plays a major role 
in many modern defense acquisition programs. Software is now an inherent part of most 
acquisition programs, and software is subsequently partly responsible for driving system 
cost and schedule overruns (Brownsword et al. 2013).  
Brownsword et al. studied several defense acquisition programs that included both 
hardware and software components and identified seven repeatable patterns of failure. 
These failed programs repeatedly failed to adequately address the following: 
1. Document business goals  
2. Resolve conflicts between goals  
3. Change to adapting needs  
4. Accommodate turbulence in the acquisition environment  
5. Give due consideration to software needs  
6. Use appropriate acquisition strategies  
7. Understand and use software quality attributes to create the architecture. 
(Brownsword et al. 2013) 
There are many reasons that a program can ultimately fail. Upon review of several 
major program failures and a review of broader research into MDAP failures, there are 
several recurring points. First, the scope of the program is important. For broad programs 
like FCS and JTRS, the structure of the program office is critical. These broad programs 
attempted to incorporate multiple new technologies and end items while ensuring 
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interoperability with existing systems and required interoperability. Second, the 
requirements need to be clearly defined and understood prior to achieving MSs. A third 
and final recurrent theme throughout the research was programs advancing when they 
clearly did not meet TRLs (GAO 2003; Pernin 2012). Research into software acquisition 
challenges reiterates these points. These three factors are possible inputs into the 
acquisition game that can help identify whether an acquisition will be a success of failure. 
2. Characteristics of Completed Acquisitions 
Program success is dependent upon the defined need or capability gap being in line 
with strategic guidance and approved by the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS), development of an acquisition strategy that aligns all 
stakeholders toward the overarching goal, and political support that endures throughout the 
acquisition life cycle. The meaning of “program success” could vary greatly, whether it is 
to what degree a program met the initial estimates of cost, schedule, and performance, or 
simply if the program avoided cancelation before achieving the goal of delivering a needed 
capability to the warfighter. This study’s definition of program success is the latter, 
delivering a capability to the warfighter. Determining what critical factors are consistent 
across successful DOD acquisition programs requires looking deeper than the triple headed 
constraints of cost, schedule, and performance. It requires a more detailed look into 
programs that led to the successful procurement of the capability the program was built to 
deliver. GAO reports show cost overruns and schedule slips for every major program and 
yet, despite these setbacks, many programs continue to reach the success threshold of 
procurement.  
Recent examples of major programs that were/are mired in cost and schedule woes 
but were still able to successfully navigate the acquisition process to procurement are the 
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Littoral Combat Ship, and V-22 Osprey (Sullivan 2009). 
These programs overcame problems and share a common set of critical success factors 
(GAO 2012, 2016). All successful programs must navigate what the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook calls “the Big A,” which consist of three separate but interconnected systems. 
The JCIDS is primarily about requirements development and validation. The Planning, 
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Programing, Budgeting, and Execution process (PPBE) is the resourcing portion of Big A 
and heavily tied to the political realm, budgetary cycles, and the National Security Strategy 
(NSS). Finally, the Defense Acquisition System (Defense Acquisition Guidebook 2004) is 
all about the acquisition process, where the MS decisions and scheduling occur. The three 
most salient critical factors shared amongst successful programs are that they all began 
with an identified and clearly communicated warfighter capability need or gap. This is 
followed by a thoughtfully designed acquisition strategy that is tailored to the capability 
being developed. And finally, they maintain the necessary funding from political support 
throughout the acquisition life cycle. 
The identification and communication of a critical capability gap that has the 
potential to inhibit the Warfighter’s ability to accomplish his mission or represents national 
security implications is a critical factor for program success. The sustainment of Joint Force 
military advantages is a priority objective written into the National Defense Strategy (NDS) 
that is nested within the NSS (Department of Defense 2018). Modernization is a key 
component in both the NDS and NSS; this fact allows for Congress and DOD leadership 
to be more lenient with cost overruns and schedule slips for programs that are supporting 
approved JCIDS requirements. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook describes the JCIDS 
process as the systematic method identifying, assessing, validating, and prioritizing Joint 
military capability requirements (Defense Acquisition Guidebook 2004). An approved 
JCIDS requirement is a critical factor for program success. The V-22 Osprey is an excellent 
example of a program plagued with problems, ballooning costs, immature technologies, 
and multiple delays, but it survived to be a successful program in large part because of the 
capability it was delivering to the joint force (Co 2009).  
Consistency of the requirements is an important factor as well. A program initiated 
from an “ill-informed requirement virtually mandates changes to contracts as requirements 
are added or changed” (Fox 2011). There are many variables that can affect requirements 
especially for the long development processes of major programs. Congressional support, 
changes in technology, current and future threats all can weigh on a program’s 
requirements (Fox 2011). But even despite changes to requirements, programs that address 
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vital capability gaps are successful because they are executing within strategic guidance 
supported by the NSS and NDS. 
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook states a program’s success relies on the 
Requirements Manager’s ability to communicate the capability need and gaps to the 
Material Developer and partner with them to define what is expected in terms of 
requirements. This is accomplished through the creation of the acquisition strategy. The 
Acquisition Strategy is a statutory requirement for MDAPs at MS A and a well thought 
out, tailored acquisition strategy is a critical factor for a program’s success. 
The acquisition strategy is a thorough, wide-ranging strategy that characterizes and 
explains the acquisition approach to manage risks within the program and meet program 
goals throughout all phases of the acquisition life cycle. It aligns all stakeholders toward a 
common objective. A program’s success hinges on the principal concepts and business 
practices that are established in this strategy. A survey of literature on acquisition success 
factors conducted by Kenneth Delano found that the most prevalent factors were “well 
defined requirements” and “acquisition strategy” (Delano 1999).  Delano’s study reviewed 
over 25 sources and he compared his work with a similar study that supported his findings. 
Within the acquisition strategy is the program’s contracting strategy which is a vital tool 
for setting conditions for success. The contracting strategy describes the plan to effectively 
manage contract administration to achieve the program’s goals. Efficient contract 
administration provides the leadership of the program the ability to incentivize and monitor 
the contractor’s performance, as all parties work together to provide the capabilities the 
government needs (Rendon n.d.). 
The PPBE process is the most political of the three “Big A” systems. The output of 
the PPBE is the DOD funding proposal for inclusion in the President’s Budget for 
submission to Congress (Defense Acquisition Guidebook 2004). All funds for defense 
programs are authorized and appropriated by Congress. While the various funding types 
are approved for different lengths of time, the appropriations that occur in Congress mean 
that political support is vital to the success of a major program (Fox 2011). Political, 
budgetary, and operational (both adversarial and friendly) factors contribute to instability 
for a program. The Joint Strike Fighter and other successful programs garnered political 
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support by dispersing the production and manufacturing across many congressional 
districts and even extended the supply chain into partnered nations (Co 2009). In fact, 
Lockheed Martin’s website boasts of the F-35’s economic impact in 48 states. The 
prevailing wisdom here is that congressional members are more likely to support funding 
defense programs that bring jobs to their districts. For this reason, political support is a 
critical success factor. Political support for programs and specifically congressional 
leniency with cost and schedule overruns can also be attributed to the need for a healthy 
defense industrial base. This is a critical element of U.S power and is explicitly stated in 
the NSS (White House 2017).  
Successful programs are able to effectively synchronize the program’s performance 
requirements, budgetary constraints and execution of the plans and objectives contained in 
the acquisition strategy (Defense Acquisition Guidebook 2004). Cost, schedule and even 
performance issues can be overcome by programs that 1) possess a defined need or 
capability gap being in line with strategic guidance and approved by JCIDS, 2) an 
acquisition strategy that aligns all stakeholder toward the overarching goal, and 3) political 
support that endures throughout the acquisition life cycle.  
C. MEASUREMENTS 
1. The Importance of Metrics 
Decision-making is inherent in project management and the defense acquisition 
environment, whether in analyzing alternatives or managing risk. Measurements aid these 
decisions by providing information to decision-makers. Hubbard (2011) defines a 
measurement as a “quantitatively expressed reduction of uncertainty based on one or more 
observations” and argues that anything that can be observed can also be measured. Metrics 
are direct numerical measures that represent a piece of data in the relationship of one or 
more dimensions. Metrics are observable and recordable in ordinal and nominal data tables, 
ranges/sets of value, simulation, statistics, calibration estimates and confidence limits, 
decision models, sampling techniques, and decomposition techniques (Kerzner 2017). The 
DOD’s Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition promotes metrics as a useful risk 
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management tool (Simpleman et al.1998). Hubbard lists three reasons for why we care 
about measurements: 
1. Measurements inform key decisions. 
2. Measurements may have a market value and could be sold for profit (e.g., 
results of customer surveys). 
3. Measurements may entertain or satisfy a curiosity. 
Hubbard’s work on measurements is often compared to “decision analysis,” which 
he embraces. He argues: 
1. Decision-makers usually have imperfect information (i.e., uncertainty) 
about the best choice for a decision.  
2. These decisions should be modeled quantitatively because quantitative 
models have a favorable track record compared to unaided expert 
judgment.  
3. Measurements inform uncertain decisions.  
4. For any decision or set of decisions, there is a large combination of things 
to measure and ways to measure them—but perfect certainty is rarely a 
realistic option. 
Although anything can be measured, measurements and their analysis come with 
an associated cost. This makes determining the “what, how, and whether” to measure 
something an economic decision. We must focus on measuring what matters to make better 
decisions (Hubbard 2011). 
2. Program Management Metrics  
Pisano, Rad, and Ginger (2006) studied program management measurements and 
their importance in the overall success of a program. Using technical performance 
measurements (TPM), earned value, and risk management techniques, probabilities of 
success can be calculated and identified early on in acquisitions. Figure 3 represents the 
TPM Methodology created during retrospective research on several federal procurements. 
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In using the TPM method in conjunction with risk analysis and probability, the likelihood 
of collecting relevant and useable data increases which can lead to cost avoidance (Pisano 
2002). 
 
 TPM Methodology Overview. Source: Pisano (2002). 
There are multiple benefits when it comes to the analysis of program management 
metrics. A significant benefit of a structured and controlled metrics identification and 
collection program is that it should reduce biases while providing a transparent view of the 
performance of the program (Rad and Ginger 2006). 
Engineers from MITRE supported the analysis and collection of leading indicators 
within systems engineering activities for a DOD customer. While not all inclusive, the 
metrics identified within Table 1 represent significant areas which impact overall success 
of acquisitions (MITRE 2014). While many of the detailed metrics may appear to be 
similar, they will be assessed differently within their indicator areas.  
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Table 1. Leading Indicators. Source: MITRE (2014). 
Leading Indicator Area Detailed Metrics Measurement Comments 
Program Resources Required Staffing Applied 




Staffed to at least 80% 
according to plan 
 
Ideally churn is less than 
5% per quarter 
Requirements Volatility/Impact Low volatility (< 5%) can 
still be a problem if the 
changing requirements 
have a large impact to the 
cost and schedule  




Are the risks coming to 
closure without significant 
impact? Alternatively, are 
there more risks being 
created over time? 
Are resources being 
applied to the risk? 
Is there appropriate 
engineering and PM 
oversight? 
Interoperability Community of Interest 
Established and Active 
Data Sharing Addressed 
Network Accessibility 
 
Ideally, a data sharing plan 
exists for members of the 
COI and addresses the data 
formats, visibility / 
discovery (to include 
metadata), and plan for 
exposure. 





(These are fairly standard 
metrics—for more 
information on software 
metrics, see NIST Special 
Publication 500-234.) 
Technology Readiness Technology Readiness TRL of at least 6 
Risk Exposure Cost Exposure 
Schedule Exposure 
15% deviation indicates 
high risk. 





Verification and Validation 
(V&V) Plan 
The degree of 
completeness and volatility 
of these items is the 
measurement. 
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Leading Indicator Area Detailed Metrics Measurement Comments 
Watchlist Items (Risks) Severity 
Closure Rate 
 
As opposed to the risk 
handling metric above, this 
one looks at the severity of 
the risks—which ones are 
likely to occur with a med-
high impact to the 
program. 
 
Our review of gamification, acquisition characteristics, and measurements prepared 
the team for creation of the methodology and identification of relevant variables used 
within our project. Through a better understanding of gamification and its uses, our team 
was able to categorize useful metrics to assist with ERDCs game development. In addition, 
a thorough understanding of characteristics within both terminated and completed 
acquisition programs helped identify critical factors and allowed further exploration of 
them.  
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III. CAPSTONE METHODOLOGY 
A. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research project was to investigate the influence of PPC on 
historical MA initiatives. The team conducted research on historical MAs, conducted an 
analysis of factors concerning PPC, developed a definition for a successful acquisition 
program, developed useful measures of effectiveness tied to our definition of success, 
conducted quantitative analysis of context variables, and provided ERDC with a 
framework for developing a predictive model for a success measure in follow-on iterations 
of their gamification effort. Five objectives were accomplished to meet the purpose of this 
research project:  
1. Define program success and develop measures of effectiveness for our 
definition.  
2. Identify common PPC factors impacting MA. 
3. Conduct a quantitative analysis of the data elicited from historical MA 
4. Identify the factors that contribute to successful or unsuccessful MA 
5. Construct a predictive model for incorporation in ERDC’s game. 
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS METHODOLOGY 
Prior to beginning quantitative analysis, preparatory work was conducted to set 
appropriate conditions. This preparatory work included building a definition of success, 
identifying common PPC factors that may influence the success of MA, collecting data, 
formatting data, and developing potentially useful measures of effectiveness (MOEs). 
1. Definition of Successful Acquisition 
To achieve our research objectives, we first defined a successful MA in terms of 
cost, schedule, and performance. The definition of success driving for the purposes of this 
study was that a program received MS C approval. This definition coincides with ERDC’s 
understanding of a successful acquisition. The ERDC’s game concludes when a system is 
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deployed, meaning that the capability has received MS C approval and will begin 
production. This definition is concise and is directly relevant to the goal of an acquisition 
initiative, delivering capability to warfighters.  
2. Identify Common PPC Factors Impacting MA 
The next step in the team’s approach to meet our project objectives was identifying 
common PPC factors that could potentially impact MA initiatives. Information from an in-
depth literature review of historical acquisition initiatives along with the team’s experience 
in program offices facilitated development of a list of potentially significant PPC factors. 
Our initial analysis resulted in a wide variety of context variables that included factors in 
the categories of cost, schedule, and performance, as well as other factors such as urgency 
of need, TRLs, and level of support. Our next step was to collect data and verify which of 
these factors had data available for quantitative analysis. 
3. Collect Data 
With an understanding of the PPC variables we believed would impact a MA in 
terms of our definition of success, the team began conducting data collection. Data 
collection was conducted by utilizing the DAVE and DAMIR databases for the majority 
of schedule, performance, and program administrative data. Simultaneously, the team 
collected cost data on Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs from CADE. These three 
websites extract data from annual, Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) and compile them 
into repositories for analysis. 
The team only collected data that met the scope of the study, which focused on new 
acquisition initiatives for technology systems. Programs that were system upgrades, 
sustainment efforts, or strictly research and development (R&D) efforts were eliminated. 
These steps resulted in a total of 79 programs remaining for analysis. This helped to ensure 
that results from this effort and consequent recommendations were appropriate for ERDC’s 
intended use in the acquisition game.  
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4. Quality Control and Data Format  
Results of the data queries were combined into a common data set in Microsoft 
Excel. Referencing historical information regarding MA initiatives, the team examined the 
available data and eliminated variables that could not reasonably be assumed to have a 
relationship with program success. This initial screening resulted in 20 variables in the 
categories of cost, schedule, performance, and administrative program data (Table 2).  
Table 2. Cost, Schedule, Performance, and Administrative Factors 





Unit Cost (Baseline) 
Number of Years 
with a Breach 
# of KPPs Joint (Y/N) 
Total Quantity 
Required (Baseline) 
Total Number of 
Scheduled Years 
# KPPs that met 
Threshold 
Lead Service 
Cost Breach (Y/N) Schedule Breach % # KPPs that met 
Objective 
Reached MS C 








R&D $ (Baseline)  Ratio of KPPs that 
met Objective 
System Type 
R&D % of Program 
Cost (Baseline) 
   
 
The cost category included six variables. These were cost per unit at initial program 
baseline, the total quantity required, whether the program experienced a cost breach, the 
baseline total program cost, the baseline R&D budget, and the R&D percentage of baseline 
program cost. Schedule variables included the number of years with a schedule breach, the 
total number of scheduled years reported by SARs, the percentage of years with a schedule 
breach as determined by years with a breach divided by total number of program years, 
and whether there was a schedule breach. The performance category consisted of data for 
the total number of KPPs, the number of KPPs that met threshold values, the number of 
KPPs that met objective values, the ratio of KPPs that met the threshold, and the ratio of 
KPPs that met the objective. The program administrative data included whether a program 
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was joint, whether the program reached MS C, whether the program was terminated, the 
lead military service, and the system type being acquired.  
The team recognized that several variables in the data set were categorical in nature. 
To develop a predictive model, which would likely be a regression model, the team 
identified a reference value for each categorical factor. Inducting dummy variables for the 
remaining values for the factor enabled the development of a linear regression model. For 
the categorical variable “lead service,” as an example, the reference variable would be 
Army and would not be explicitly identified as a variable, while the other military services 
would be identified with dummy variables. (Pardoe, 2012). 
5. Develop Potentially Useful Measures of Effectiveness 
The team determined next if any of the variables could be used directly as a MOE 
for success. There were three potentially useful MOEs: R&D funds percentage of baseline 
program cost, schedule breach percentage, and the ratio of KPPs that met threshold. These 
MOEs would be used as the dependent variables in the analysis in Chapter IV.  
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND PREDICTIVE MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT 
The team took a seven-step approach to our statistical analysis and development of 
the predictive model.  
1. Hypothesis Testing 
The team first applied hypothesis testing to screen out MOEs that were not 
indicators of a successful program. The set of programs were divided into two groups: 
successful (received approval at MS C) and unsuccessful (did not receive approval at MS 
C). The team tested if the average MOE for each group was significantly different. If the 
average MOE was significantly different between the two groups, then the MOE was kept 
for continued analysis. Otherwise, the MOE was discarded.  
25 
2. Visual Analysis 
The team then used visualization techniques to identify any possible linear 
relationship between the MOEs and the variables in the data set. Visualization provides 
initial insights for developing a mathematical expression for strong relationships. 
Individual analysis could also further screen out factors that do not indicate any relationship 
to the MOE.  
3. Single Factor ANOVA 
Next, the team conducted single factor ANOVAs to understand which factors were 
statistically significant in terms of their impact on each MOE. The ANOVA offers 
statistical evidence that changes in the values of the factor influenced the value of the MOE. 
4. Initial Main Effects Regression Model  
The team constructed a predictive model using only main effects. Regression 
analyses provided an understanding of which main effects should remain in the model. The 
initial model development incorporated seventeen (17) factors. The results would show the 
amount of variance of the MOE that the model could explain. Analysis would direct the 
development of a more parsimonious model that would explain more of the MOE 
variability, while increasing the tractability of the model, for instance to reasonably explain 
how the changes in the main factors would change the MOE. 
5. Explore Interactions Terms via Two-Factor ANOVA 
The initial predictive model consisted only of main factors. It is reasonable to 
believe that some of the factors were correlated, therefore requiring interaction terms be 
part of the model. To examine this possibility, the team employed two-factor ANOVA to 
identify any significant two-way interactions for inclusion in the final model. Similar to 
single factor ANOVA, two-factor ANOVA provides statistical evidence that simultaneous 
changes in factor values influence changes in the MOE. 
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6. Model Development and Cross-Validation 
The final step in the process was to conduct cross-validation on the model. This 
was accomplished by randomly selecting 20% of our programs and removing them from 
the database. The remaining 80% of acquisition programs were then used to build the 
predictive model. This model was then used to predict the outcome of the 20% of programs 
removed from the dataset to analyze the validity of our model. 
7. Residual Analysis 
Residual analysis was conducted to assess the appropriateness of the linear 
regression model. The residual analysis was conducted visually and statistically to ensure 
that the residuals exhibited the assumptions for developing a regression model.  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. ACQUISITION PROGRAM DATA 
Data collection consisted of examining past and ongoing acquisition programs from 
a variety of sources. DAVE included many spreadsheets compiled from SARs submitted 
between 1998–2020. These SARs and subsequent spreadsheets provided the most detailed 
information available on a wide breadth of acquisition initiatives for study. After initial 
data collection, the team had information from 211 historical U.S. ACAT I programs. The 
next step was to format the data and organize the spreadsheet for quantitative analysis. The 
information extracted from DAVE and DAMIR was compared against the information 
from CADE. Any programs that did not have data in both spreadsheets were deleted to 
ensure completeness of cost, schedule, performance, and administrative program data. This 
resulted in a data set of 79 programs for analysis. The resulting Excel spreadsheet was used 
to conduct analysis. See Appendix A. 
B. T-TEST HYPOTHESIS TESTING TO IDENTIFY USEFUL MEASURES 
The means of a useful MOE should be statistically different between successful and 
unsuccessful programs. We separated programs in the data set into successful programs 
and unsuccessful programs. We conducted a simple analysis of the averages for programs 
pooled as successful and those pooled as unsuccessful to identify a statistical difference. 
The general formulation of the hypothesis test follows. 
H0: µA = µB 
Halt: µA ≠ µB 
We ran each MOE through a t-test to determine whether there was a difference in 
means between successful and unsuccessful programs using the following null and 
alternative hypotheses:  
H0: µsuccessful programs = µunsuccessful programs 
Halt: µsuccessful programs ≠ µunsuccessful programs 
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T-tests were run in Excel using alpha=0.01 and we compared the test statistic 
against the t-critical value which allowed us to determine if there was a statistically 
significant difference in means. Results with a test statistic greater than the t-critical value 
indicate a difference in means and leads us to reject the null hypothesis as there is enough 
evidence to support the alternative hypothesis. Results with a test statistic less than the t-
critical value indicates no difference in means and leads us to fail to reject the null 
hypothesis as there is not enough evidence to support the alternative hypothesis. The results 
of the t-tests of each MOE are shown in Table 3. A statistically significant difference in 
means was found in the MOEs “ratio of KPPs that met threshold” and “schedule breach 
ratio,” indicating that these two MOEs were useful for further analysis and possible 
development of a predictive model.  
Table 3. T-test Hypothesis Testing Results 
 
 
Based on our acquisition experience, we believed that these were useful measures 
of effectiveness with one measure each representing cost, schedule, and performance. 
These MOEs exhibit characteristics of good measures because they are measurable by the 
compiled data set, reliable as they are sourced from congressionally mandated annual 
reports and are operationally practical as they represent a programs performance and 
schedule.  
C. VISUAL ANALYSIS 
We visually analyzed scatter plots between MOEs versus the individual factors. 
Figure 4 is one example. The display shows the ratio of KPPs that met threshold along the 
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Y-axis versus the ratio of R&D money to the total program baseline cost along the X-axis. 
This example demonstrates a visual comparison resulting in no definitive relationship 
between MOE and factor. We continued this process with other factors with similar results. 
 
 Ratio of KPPs that Meet Threshold vs. Percentage of Baseline 
Program Cost on R&D 
D. SINGLE FACTOR ANOVA 
Visual analysis did not show linear relationships between factors and MOEs. 
However, single factor ANOVA provided another approach to determine if a factor was 
related to any of the MOEs. Programs were separated by whether they were joint or led by 
a single military service, for example. Once separated, a single factor ANOVA was 
conducted to provide the F-statistic and F-critical value for the ANOVA. If the F-statistic 
is larger than the F-critical value, then the analyzed factor is useful for explaining 
variability within the MOE. This means that as the factor value increases or decreases, the 
MOE value will also change. We found that a program’s jointness was significant for 
explaining variability in the ratio of KPPs that met threshold MOE. See Table 4. We see 
that the F-statistic from the data exceed the F-critical value, thereby rejecting the null 
hypothesis that a change in factor values do not affect the MOE. 
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Table 4. Single Factor ANOVA for Program Jointness within the KPP 
Ratio to Meet Threshold MOE 
 
 
When analyzing system type as a potential contributing factor, analysis revealed 
that there was significance among some system types in explaining variability, specifically 
Combat Vehicles and Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence (C3I). The 
team reduced the system types into three bins: combat vehicle, C3I, and other systems. 
Using these three bins, single factor ANOVA showed that system type was a significant 
factor within the MOE of ratio of KPPs that met threshold. See Table 5. However, system 
type was not a significant factor for explaining variability in the schedule breach ratio 
MOE. 
Table 5. Single Factor ANOVA for System Type within the KPP Ratio to 
Meet Threshold MOE 
 
 
This process was conducted for each factor that the team believed may have 
explained variability on the two MOEs. We found that in addition to Jointness and System 
Type, the factor of Lead Service was also useful in explaining variability within the ratio 
of KPPs that met threshold MOE. Table 6 shows the results of the single factor ANOVA 
of Lead Service within the ratio of KPPs that met threshold MOE. 
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Table 6. Single Factor ANOVA for Lead Service within the KPP Ratio to 
Meet Threshold MOE 
 
 
On the other hand, some factors were found to have no significant impact on the 
MOEs. For example, the team hypothesized that the baseline total program cost for a 
specific program may have an impact on the selected MOEs. The single factor ANOVA 
was conducted after separating the programs into cost bin of $0-$100M, $100M-$1B, and 
greater than $1B. Table 7 shows the results of ANOVA of baseline total program cost 
within the ratio of KPP that met threshold MOE. The F-statistic is less than the F-critical 
value, indicating that the analyzed factor does not explain variability within the MOE.  
Table 7. Single Factor ANOVA for Baseline Total Program Cost within the 
KPP Ratio to meet Threshold MOE 
 
 
We continued this process and examined factors using different bin sizes to show 
potentially hidden interactions. We utilized the same approach for each of the factors and 
ultimately discovered that only one of the MOEs could be explained by the factors. The 
variability of the ratio of KPPs that met threshold MOE could be explained by three factors: 
Jointness, System Type, and Lead Service. No factors were useful for explaining the 
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variability within the Schedule Breach MOE. Therefore, the team dropped Schedule 
Breach and focused on KPP% as the MOE upon which to build a predictive model. 
E. INITIAL MAIN EFFECTS REGRESSION MODEL 
The next step was to construct a predictive model with KPP% as the dependent 
variable and Jointness, System Type, and Lead Service as the independent variables. This 
was done using regression.  
All explanatory variables were categorical. Therefore, the team used dummy 
variables to represent the categorical variables. Regression analysis in Excel treats all 
independent variables in the analysis as numerical. The process of using dummy variables 
can be explained using Lead Service as an example. For the data, there were three lead 
service entities: Army, Navy, and Air Force. We established Army as the reference 
variable, meaning that the value for the dummy variables for Navy and Airforce would 
each be zero. If the lead service was Navy, Navy would receive a 1 and Air Force would 
be zero. If Air Force was the lead service, Air Force would receive a value of 1 and Navy 
would be zero. See Table 8. 
Table 8. Dummy Variable Use in Regression Analysis. 
 
 
The process of incorporating dummy variables continued for each of the other 
categorical factors. The regression tool was then used to create a simple linear model for 
each individual factor and KPP%. Each simple model was appropriate for the given data. 
The team next developed a multilinear regression model (Figure 5).  
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 Initial Main Effects Predictive Model for KPP Percentage. 
Evaluation of this main effects model showed it could explain a much larger 
percentage of variability in KPP% than a model that used all seventeen possible factors. 
Residual analysis showed that in general, the assumptions for using regression was met. 
However, there was an anomaly that that the team did not have sufficient time to explore. 
This anomaly will be further discussed in the development of the full model, which 
includes interaction terms.  
F. EXPLORE INTERACTION TERMS VIA TWO FACTOR ANOVA 
The predictive model only accounted for main effects. The next step was to conduct 
a two-factor ANOVA to understand if any two-way interactions should be included in the 
model. The team examined three potential two-way interactions: “Joint – System Type,” 
“Lead Service – System Type,” and “Joint – Lead Service.”  
Using the two-factor ANOVA in Excel, we compared the F-statistic and the F-
critical values. The results of the two-factor ANOVA are shown in Table 9, which indicates 
that the coefficients for Joint – System Type and Lead Service – System Type should be 
included in the model. 




G. FINAL PREDICTIVE MODEL 
Upon completion of two-factor ANOVA, the team moved into building and 
validating the model. Even though two-factor ANOVA supported that the Lead Service – 
System Type relationship was significant, further analysis showed that this interaction term 
was not significant.  
H0: βlead service – system type = 0 
Halt: βlead service – system type ≠ 0 
The hypothesis test on the interaction term’s coefficient showed that the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected. Therefore, it should not be a term in the predictive model. 
At this point, the team rebuilt the model using only a single two-way interaction between 
joint – system type, along with the main effects terms.  
Review of the remaining terms provided an understanding for the tractability of the 
overall model. For instance, whether a system is joint can have significant effects on the 
ease or difficulty of procuring the system. A joint system requires more coordination and 
communication, which can impact the acquisition process. A joint system may have 
different, competing requirements than for a system that must only meet a specific service’s 
needs. These competing requirements may leave little trade-space and the desired 
capabilities for different mission sets may be difficult to integrate. This difficulty is 
represented by the negative coefficient for joint programs. Lead services each have 
different processes for acquiring new systems. The model showed that the Navy has a 
higher positive impact than other services. Additionally, system type showed that C3I and 
combat vehicle were useful in explaining variability. This again made logical sense. C3I 
systems are often extremely technical, software heavy, require more research, higher 
interoperability, and are generally more complex. This is accounted for in the large, 
negative coefficient. Combat vehicles, on the other hand, are not as complex relative to 
C3I and have a positive coefficient. When these factors were all accounted for, the final 
predictive model resulted in the formula in Figure 6  
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 Final Predictive Model for KPP% 
H. CROSS VALIDATION 
The team checked the viability of the model through cross-validation. This was 
conducted by randomly selecting 20% of the 79 programs in the data set to be test cases. 
The remaining 63 programs were then used to recreate the final predictive model in  
Figure 6.  
We applied the model to the remaining 20%, or 16 programs that were set aside. 
Using values from these documented programs, the predictive model computed KPP% for 
each program. Applying the standard error of the prediction model, we built a 95% 
prediction interval around the predicted KPP%. A prediction interval is larger than a 
confidence interval since it must account for the variability of a new observation 
(Montgomery and Runger 2013). Of the 16 test cases, 15 of the actual KPP% fell within 
the prediction interval. This result showed that the model was good and appropriate for the 
data available. 
I. RESIDUAL ANALYSIS 
The final step was to conduct an analysis of the residuals on the final model using 
the full data set to assess the appropriateness of the linear regression model. This analysis 
was conducted by analyzing the residuals in two ways. First, we analyzed the mean. A 
good model should have a mean that approaches zero. The model’s mean residual was 
statistically zero (1.363E-16).  
The second analysis step was visual. We first analyzed the residual scatter plot. 
Linear regression is appropriate when the plot of residuals in a scatterplot exhibits a random 
pattern. The residual model is shown in Figure 7.  
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 Full Model Residual Plot 
The residuals appear random and equally distributed above and below zero. There 
are no curvatures, fanning, or funneling patterns that would indicate that a regression model 
is inappropriate for the data. In comparison, charts (b), (c), and (d) in Figure 8 depict 
problematic patterns for residual plots (Montgomery and Runger 2013).  
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 Patterns for Residual Plots. (a) Satisfactory, (b) Funnel, (c) Double 
Bow, (d) Nonlinear. Source: Montgomery and Runger (2013). 
The residual plot in Figure 7 from the final predictive model does not exhibit the 
issues in Figure 8b, c, or d. In general, Figure 7 most closely matches Figure 8a, a 
satisfactory residual plot. We acknowledge that at the top part of the plot some of the 
residuals, circled in red, appear linear. Study of the specific programs associated with those 
residuals show that three of the four top left points are C3I systems. The remaining points 
are a mix of joint and not joint, different services, and different system types. The data 
behind these specific points is in Appendix B. A possible approach for exploration is to 
transform the C3I or System Type data. However, the team did not have time to explore 
this anomaly but recognizes that it warrants investigation and will be one of the team’s 
recommendations for future work. 
After analyzing the residual scatterplot, the team generated a histogram (Figure 9) 
of the residuals. A histogram for residuals should exhibit a bell or normal curve. The 
histogram shows some negative skewness, but still exhibits a somewhat bell shape centered 
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around zero. It is possible that with additional data, the histogram would follow a normal 
curve.  
 
 Residual Histogram 
The residual analysis allowed us to conclude that the model was appropriate and 
adequate based on the data that we collected from DAVE, CADE, and DAMIR for ACAT 
I U.S. acquisition programs. If we included all the possible factors that we started with into 
the model, the amount of variability of KPP% that the model would explain was less than 
9%. The final model we developed now explains over 30% of the variability in the KPP% 
MOE, a substantial improvement that can indicate success or failure of future acquisition 
initiatives. Based on our cross validation, the model demonstrates a degree of capability to 
predict the KPP% for a future MA initiative.  
In conclusion, the results of our analysis have led to the development of a stepwise 
methodology that can be used as a model for future analysis of different context variables 
as leading indicators of an acquisition program’s success. Figure 10 depicts the eight steps 
of this methodology. 
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 Methodology for Analyzing Context Variables as Leading 
Indicators of Acquisition Success 
Our model is imperfect but is an improvement to no analytical model. As different 
data sets are explored, there will likely be more useful factors to include in this model. The 
steps that have been documented in this analysis provided a map for incorporating new 
factors, new data sets, and new MOEs for success. 
  
Step 8: Perform residual analysis to determine appropriateness and goodness of the model
Step 7: Conduct cross-validation to test the viability of the model
Step 6: Development of a multilinear regression model
Step 5: Development of a simple linear regression model and evaluation
Step 4: Statistical analysis to understand correlation and relationships
Step 3: Visualization to gain insight for data relationships and potential explanatory variables
Step 2: Measures development
Step 1: Data collection
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY  
Our sponsor, ERDC, was seeking to create an acquisition game simulation that 
could model MAs for not only the United States, but also partnered and adversary nations. 
Their intent was to better understand how product, process, and context explain why 
different countries are either more or less successful in their respective acquisition 
processes. While ERDC had a thorough understanding of gamification and system 
dynamics, our team contributed to their effort by developing a predictive model and 
validating a methodology framework for further quantification of context variables.  
The ERDC sought to create a game that was not product specific and could be 
applied to other countries to show how they develop any type of capability. To accomplish 
this, ERDC looked at a variety of factors when developing their game, such as workforce, 
military funding, and education. The ERDC defined workforce as “the workforce available 
for the acquisition process,” while military funding was defined as “relative budget for 
acquisition.” (Ruvinsky et al. 2021). These factors were largely static and high level for 
the specific countries studied. Our team instead looked at specific program data for 211 
U.S. ACAT I MA initiatives. This approach allowed us to develop potentially useful 
MOEs, identify factors that explained variability in that MOE, and ultimately impacted the 
success or failure of specific acquisition initiatives.  
The major contribution that our team made to this project was the development of 
useful MOEs and a predictive model to understand how individual factors explained that 
variability. While ERDC incorporated context variables in a very broad way, our team was 
able to use quantifiable data from DAVE and CADE to show how individual factors impact 
useful MOEs and ultimately impact the success of failure of an acquisition initiative.  
Our contribution is not simply understanding how several factors impact the 
selected MOE, but the analytical framework to continue research into the future. The steps 
that have been documented in this analysis provided a map for incorporating new factors, 
new data sets, and new MOEs for success. The methodology used to construct the 
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predictive model can be used to improve upon the model’s usefulness as more data about 
U.S. MA is compiled, and as well as for different countries if the data becomes available.  
Achieving the project objectives provided value to the sponsor. Common PPC 
factors impacting MA were identified from the available data and quantitatively analyzed. 
The team initially used logic to identify factors we believed may impact the success or 
failure of a MA initiative. Once data collection was complete, the team analytically 
examined factors until they understood the impact that Lead Service, Program Jointness, 
and System Type had on the ratio of KPPs that met program threshold values. The 
analytical methodology validated during our analysis will potentially enable ERDC to 
examine process and product factors in the future. 
The team initially had to define what constituted program success. This project 
defined a successful program as a program that achieves MS C without being terminated 
or restructured. This mark was chosen because it was available for analysis of the data. It 
also allowed the separation of programs into successes and failures for further analysis. 
The team developed measures of effectiveness tied to this definition of success. 
The collected data from historical acquisitions was subjected to quantitative 
analysis that facilitated the examination of a wide breadth of programs. While ERDC 
examined high level factors that impact the acquisition process at the country level, the 
team’s analysis was focused on historical acquisitions with specific data. This data allowed 
the development of a predictive model that can be used for predicting the success or failure 
of future U.S. programs.  
B. IMPACT TO SPONSOR 
The ERDC acknowledged during the team’s final capstone brief that the work the 
team conducted would be beneficial in follow-on research. Specifically, the MOE 
“percentage of KPPs that met threshold” aligns well with ERDC’s expectation for 
gameplay. The ERDC examined a country’s capability for acquiring a product and 
understand that a product must meet performance parameters. Their game simulated a 
prototyping phase and verification/validation phase which determined whether a system 
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met performance objectives. Our methodology allows ERDC to quantify the performance 
aspects of an acquisition initiative in the future.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
There are many areas where the methodology of this project can help ERDC expand 
research into their gamification effort. The team’s current analysis was focused on 
uncontrollable context variables due to the available data. Future research efforts can 
expand the analytical framework developed by the team and seek additional data to further 
identify additional factors will allow better prediction of the outcome of specific 
acquisition initiatives.  
One such potential factor to be considered in future research should be the TRL of 
acquisition initiatives. The team reasoned that the lower level of the TRL (the more 
immature the technology was) at program initiation, the greater the risk was to program 
success. The team was unable to collect enough data due to time limitations to analyze this 
factor. Future research efforts to understand and quantify how TRLs impact success or 
failure could be done through the study of GAO reports or similar sources to conduct small 
scale analysis. The team also recommends that acquisition databases like DAVE include 
TRL information in the future as technology readiness is a likely indicator of program 
success.  
Another area that should be studied in the future is the urgency of the need. In 
collecting data, the team was unable to find any specific description of the urgency of need. 
The team reasoned that as the urgency of need increases, the likelihood of program success 
also increases. This could be due to several factors such as political will, willingness to 
allocate funds, perceived seriousness of a capability gap; urgency of need appears 
significant and worthy of additional study as data becomes available.  
This study was specifically focused on U.S. ACAT I MAs. In the future, as data 
allows, further study of individual countries is warranted. The ERDC focused research on 
Russia and Germany with additional analysis on China. This research was conducted to 
identify specific acquisition process frameworks for each country but ultimately resulted 
in a generic acquisition framework. Understanding each country’s unique framework and 
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focusing on those context variables through the lens of this project’s predictive modeling 
methodology would be beneficial in understanding how these principals apply to other 
countries.  
As noted in Chapter IV, visual analysis of the initial scatterplots created with the 
available data failed to identify correlation between factors. Future research may find 
additional correlation between factors if they conduct data transformation. This 
transformation may provide insight into other factors that influence MOEs as well as the 
potential for additional significant MOEs beyond those included in this research. 
Additionally, some potentially unexplained linearity in the residual plot existed, 
particularly with C3I systems. Future research to attempt to explain this phenomenon 
appears warranted. Due to the scope and timeline of this project, the team was limited to 
analyzing the data as collected.  
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APPENDIX A. CLEAN SPREADSHEET FOR ANALYSIS (79 PROGRAMS) 
The spreadsheet shown in Table 10 shows the manageable data set created by the team’s data collection and filtering efforts. 
This spreadsheet served as the clean data set that was used to conduct statistical analysis. Each column represents a different factor that 
was analyzed. Column M is the Ratio of KPPs that met threshold MOE. Columns B-D are the factors that explain the variance in the 
MOE.  
Table 10. Clean Spreadsheet for Analysis (79 Programs) 
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2 Cost and Schedule Common Programs              
3 ACV FoV Combat Vehicle No Navy $         4,978,000 240 $       1,835,700,000 $       769,300,000 42% Yes 10 10 100% 0 5 0% 
4 AEHF Sensor/Radar/Satellite No Air Force $  1,328,000,000 2 $        2,715,100,000 $           59,100,000 2% No 5 5 100% 9 21 43% 
5 AFATDS (ATCCS) C3I No Army $              103,000 5,191 $       1,095,900,000 $       560,000,000 51% Yes 13 3 23% 1 2 50% 
6 AGM-88E AARGM Guided Munitions/Missiles No Navy $              461,000 1,919 $       1,339,800,000 $       533,300,000 40% Yes 3 3 100% 2 17 12% 
7 AIM-9X BLOCK I Guided Munitions/Missiles Yes Navy $              193,000 10,000 $      2,464,000,000 $        531,400,000 22% Yes 12 12 100% 2 14 14% 
8 AMRAAM Guided Munitions/Missiles Yes Air Force $             783,000 15,450 $     12,278,200,000 $     1,725,700,000 14% Yes 2 2 100% 6 22 27% 
9 AN/TPQ-53 Sensor/Radar/Satellite No Army $        17,456,000 189 $      3,658,300,000 $       340,700,000 9% No 4 4 100% 0 2 0% 
10 ATIRCM/CMWS Sensor/Radar/Satellite Yes Army $           1,310,000 2,002 $      2,795,700,000 $       593,000,000 21% No 7 2 29% 9 14 64% 
11 B-2 EHF Inc 1 Aircraft/Helicopter No Air Force $         7,353,000 17 $          659,700,000 $       544,900,000 83% No 2 2 100% 0 10 0% 
12 B-2 RMP Aircraft/Helicopter No Air Force $       36,000,000 14 $        1,148,400,000 $       644,400,000 56% No 7 7 100% 5 8 63% 
13 B61 Mod 12 LEP TKA Guided Munitions/Missiles No Air Force $             386,000 813 $        1,321,600,000 $     1,007,600,000 76% No 3 3 100% 0 8 0% 
14 BRADLEY UPGRADE Combat Vehicle No Army $         3,778,000 595 $      3,724,200,000 $       529,600,000 14% Yes 10 10 100% 1 13 8% 
15 C-27J Aircraft/Helicopter No Air Force $       46,605,000 78 $      3,449,200,000 $          117,100,000 3% Yes 21 17 81% 1 4 25% 
16 C-5 RERP Aircraft/Helicopter No Air Force $     137,225,000 52 $       5,415,900,000 $      1,691,200,000 31% No 5 5 100% 3 16 19% 
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17 CH-47F Aircraft/Helicopter No Army $       22,957,000 525 $      10,614,800,000 $        179,700,000 2% Yes 6 6 100% 2 20 10% 
18 EFV Combat Vehicle No Navy $       22,240,000 593 $      8,493,200,000 $     1,532,400,000 18% Yes 10 8 80% 8 22 36% 
19 Excalibur Guided Munitions/Missiles No Army $             226,000 7,474 $       1,654,600,000 $       993,400,000 60% Yes 9 9 100% 1 14 7% 
20 F/A-18E/F Aircraft/Helicopter No Navy $        83,815,000 565 $    38,884,700,000 $    5,889,400,000 15% Yes 21 21 100% 1 15 7% 
21 FCS Combat Vehicle Yes Army $  8,010,027,000 15 $     59,100,000,000 $ 24,988,600,000 42% Yes 7 1 14% 1 6 17% 
22 FMTV Combat Vehicle No Army $               171,000 80,228 $     16,697,700,000 $        168,800,000 1% Yes 16 3 19% 2 16 13% 
23 G/ATOR Sensor/Radar/Satellite No Navy $          62,111,000 45 $        3,118,800,000 $       1,110,900,000 36% No 13 5 38% 0 9 0% 
24 GMLRS/GMLRS AW Guided Munitions/Missiles No Army $              104,000 79,082 $      12,751,400,000 $     1,360,000,000 11% Yes 11 7 64% 4 23 17% 
25 GPS III Sensor/Radar/Satellite No Air Force $     230,167,000 6 $       4,142,900,000 $    2,623,900,000 63% No 7 7 100% 4 13 31% 
26 HIMARS Combat Vehicle No Army $         3,853,000 888 $        3,711,600,000 $       206,300,000 6% No 11 11 100% 0 10 0% 
27 HMS C3I Yes Army $               28,000 328,514 $      8,242,600,000 $     1,254,700,000 15% No 8 6 75% 13 17 76% 
28 IDECM C3I No Navy $         2,764,000 324 $       1,305,200,000 $       409,700,000 31% No 2 2 100% 3 13 23% 
29 INCREMENT 1 E-IBCT Combat Vehicle No Army $     285,100,000 9 $       3,149,500,000 $       583,600,000 19% Yes 3 3 100% 0 2 0% 
30 IRST Sensor/Radar/Satellite No Navy $          7,014,000 170 $        1,914,600,000 $       764,000,000 40% Yes 1 1 100% 0 4 0% 
31 JAGM Guided Munitions/Missiles Yes Army $             226,000 26,319 $      7,070,400,000 $     1,074,900,000 15% No 10 8 80% 1 6 17% 
32 JASSM Guided Munitions/Missiles Yes Air Force $           1,150,000 2,866 $       2,195,000,000 $         159,100,000 7% Yes 3 3 100% 3 23 13% 
33 JDAM Guided Munitions/Missiles Yes Air Force $                17,000 661,305 $      2,300,300,000 $       490,300,000 21% No 12 7 58% 4 22 18% 
34 JLENS C3I Yes Army $    287,643,000 14 $      5,850,000,000 $     1,760,000,000 30% Yes 7 5 71% 4 10 40% 
35 JLTV Combat Vehicle Yes Army $              361,000 64,489 $     19,699,500,000 $        941,400,000 5% No 7 3 43% 2 8 25% 
36 JOINT MRAP Combat Vehicle Yes Navy $          1,504,000 25,474 $     22,013,500,000 $       227,900,000 1% Yes 6 6 100% 1 4 25% 
37 JPATS Aircraft/Helicopter Yes Air Force $         5,883,000 767 $      4,529,000,000 $       289,200,000 6% Yes 14 14 100% 1 16 6% 
38 JSIMS C3I Yes Army $     170,800,000 1 $        1,281,600,000 $       1,110,800,000 87% No 4 1 25% 2 3 67% 
39 JSIPS (CIGS) C3I Yes Air Force $       33,640,000 5 $          586,300,000 $       322,000,000 55% No 15 7 47% 0 2 0% 
40 JSOW Guided Munitions/Missiles Yes Navy $             282,000 3,334 $       5,544,100,000 $       836,800,000 15% Yes 3 3 100% 7 18 39% 
41 JTRS GMR C3I Yes Army $              126,000 108,086 $     14,437,200,000 $        845,100,000 6% Yes 10 0 0% 6 11 55% 
42 KC-130J Aircraft/Helicopter No Air Force $       88,445,000 104 $      9,233,900,000 $          35,600,000 0% No 4 4 100% 0 10 0% 
43 KC-46A Aircraft/Helicopter No Air Force $    203,999,000 175 $     43,518,200,000 $    6,804,200,000 16% Yes 8 1 13% 3 10 30% 
44 LAND WARRIOR C3I No Army $              139,000 58,900 $       2,451,500,000 $       734,400,000 30% Yes 13 6 46% 1 5 20% 
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45 LCS Ship No Navy $              582,018 53 $      32,011,000,000 $    3,433,300,000 11% Yes 8 5 63% 10 17 59% 
46 LCS MM Ship No Navy $       69,775,000 59 $      6,379,500,000 $    2,233,700,000 35% No 6 2 33% 3 7 43% 
47 LHA 6 Ship No Navy $ 2,677,500,000 1 $      2,877,400,000 $        199,900,000 7% Yes 14 10 71% 5 8 63% 
48 LHD 1 Ship No Navy $    963,967,000 3 $       2,931,800,000 $          39,900,000 1% Yes 17 17 100% 0 8 0% 
49 LONGBOW APACHE Aircraft/Helicopter No Army $         6,665,000 758 $          672,200,000 $        412,700,000 61% Yes 4 4 100% 0 14 0% 
50 LPD 17 Ship No Navy $    744,950,000 12 $        9,018,100,000 $          78,700,000 1% Yes 18 18 100% 8 23 35% 
51 M88A2 HERCULES Combat Vehicle No Army $         2,464,000 933 $      2,354,600,000 $          55,900,000 2% No 8 8 100% 0 4 0% 
52 MH-60R Aircraft/Helicopter No Navy $        36,143,000 188 $      4,020,500,000 $       508,400,000 13% Yes 3 3 100% 3 20 15% 
53 MH-60S Aircraft/Helicopter No Navy $       20,587,000 165 $      2,769,000,000 $           71,000,000 3% Yes 21 18 86% 11 17 65% 
54 MHC 51 Ship No Navy $     135,575,000 12 $       1,457,400,000 $           17,200,000 1% Yes 10 10 100% 0 2 0% 
55 MIDS C3I Yes Navy $             339,000 630 $          924,900,000 $         481,100,000 52% Yes 51 51 100% 8 23 35% 
56 MQ-1B UAS PREDATOR Aircraft/Helicopter No Air Force $         11,475,000 248 $       3,127,800,000 $        282,100,000 9% No 8 7 88% 0 1 0% 
57 MQ-1C Gray Eagle Aircraft/Helicopter No Army $    267,992,000 12 $      3,922,300,000 $     3,215,900,000 82% Yes 2 2 100% 1 11 9% 
58 MQ-4C Triton Aircraft/Helicopter No Navy $      141,780,000 65 $      11,860,500,000 $    2,989,300,000 25% No 6 6 100% 3 11 27% 
59 MQ-8 Fire Scout Aircraft/Helicopter No Navy $        30,071,000 168 $      2,063,500,000 $         541,100,000 26% Yes 12 12 100% 8 14 57% 
60 MQ-9 Reaper Aircraft/Helicopter No Air Force $       25,320,000 388 $     10,602,800,000 $       778,800,000 7% No 3 2 67% 3 11 27% 
61 MUOS Sensor/Radar/Satellite No Navy $    647,750,000 4 $      5,705,000,000 $      3,114,000,000 55% No 7 7 100% 8 14 57% 
62 NAS Sensor/Radar/Satellite Yes Air Force $        13,325,000 53 $          570,300,000 $          96,600,000 17% Yes 8 5 63% 1 17 6% 
63 NSSL Space  No Air Force $     391,247,000 181 $       13,116,600,000 $     1,344,000,000 10% Yes 10 10 100% 6 23 26% 
64 P-8A Aircraft/Helicopter No Navy $      201,018,000 108 $    26,376,500,000 $    6,429,600,000 24% No 8 8 100% 0 17 0% 
65 PAC-3 Guided Munitions/Missiles Yes Army $         4,750,000 54 $      4,798,800,000 $     2,015,600,000 42% Yes 2 1 50% 1 14 7% 
66 PAC-3 MSE Guided Munitions/Missiles No Army $          4,813,000 1,528 $      6,220,900,000 $       460,900,000 7% No 7 4 57% 1 7 14% 
67 PIM Combat Vehicle No Army $        10,358,000 580 $       6,641,000,000 $     1,000,900,000 15% Yes 7 3 43% 3 9 33% 
68 RMS C3I No Navy $          12,115,000 106 $       1,304,600,000 $        418,000,000 32% Yes 6 0 0% 5 10 50% 
69 SDB I Guided Munitions/Missiles No Air Force $               59,000 24,070 $       1,786,300,000 $        381,300,000 21% No 6 6 100% 0 5 0% 
70 SINCGARS C3I No Army $                19,000 292,853 $        5,611,700,000 $        135,400,000 2% No 18 18 100% 0 12 0% 
71 SMART-T C3I Yes Army $         2,203,000 364 $       1,027,200,000 $       225,400,000 22% Yes 20 16 80% 1 9 11% 
72 STRATEGIC SEALIFT Ship No Navy $    322,425,000 20 $            64,884,000 $          39,900,000 61% Yes 13 11 85% 2 9 22% 
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73 STRYKER Combat Vehicle No Army $         2,956,000 2,131 $       7,120,200,000 $       508,000,000 7% Yes 15 15 100% 11 13 85% 
74 T-45TS Aircraft/Helicopter No Navy $        13,730,000 304 $      5,462,000,000 $     1,342,900,000 25% Yes 31 31 100% 0 11 0% 
75 T-AKE Ship No Navy $    353,050,000 12 $      4,262,600,000 $          26,000,000 1% No 9 9 100% 1 16 6% 
76 TWS Combat Vehicle No Army $                12,000 237,788 $       2,956,100,000 $          72,600,000 2% No 7 7 100% 0 2 0% 
77 UH-60M Black Hawk Aircraft/Helicopter No Army $          11,812,000 1,221 $     14,662,000,000 $       286,700,000 2% Yes 18 12 67% 2 19 11% 
78 UH-72 LUH Aircraft/Helicopter No Army $         5,838,000 322 $       1,883,000,000 $             3,100,000 0% No 5 5 100% 0 2 0% 
79 V-22 Aircraft/Helicopter Yes Navy $       84,568,000 456 $ 385,628,000,000 $   11,446,500,000 3% Yes 30 28 93% 8 23 35% 
80 WGS Sensor/Radar/Satellite No Air Force $    287,900,000 3 $       1,042,500,000 $        178,800,000 17% No 4 4 100% 4 19 21% 
81 WIN-T INC 1 C3I No Army $         2,299,000 1,677 $      3,879,700,000 $          23,700,000 1% Yes 1 0 0% 3 6 50% 
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APPENDIX B. UNEXPLAINED LINEAR RESIDUAL POINTS 
This appendix presents the data for the residual plots that appeared to be linear in 
Chapter IV. Figure 11 highlights the datapoints in question that we did not have time to 
investigate, and determine, an explanation for the linear appearance prior to concluding 
this capstone. Table 11 shows the various system types, joint status, and lead service as 
well as the corresponding residual values.  
 








































































































1 No Army C3I 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.39986 0.60014 
2 No Navy C3I 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.54644 0.45356 
3 Yes Navy Combat Vehicle 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.62153 0.37847 
4 Yes Navy C3I 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.67893 0.32107 
5 No Army Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.78131 0.21869 
 No Army Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.78131 0.21869 
 No Army Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.78131 0.21869 
 No Army Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.78131 0.21869 
 No Army Guided Munitions/ 
Missiles 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.78131 0.21869 
 No Army Sensor/ Radar/ 
Satellite 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.78131 0.21869 
6 No Army Combat Vehicle 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.81229 0.18771 
 No Army Combat Vehicle 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.81229 0.18771 
 No Army Combat Vehicle 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.81229 0.18771 
 No Army Combat Vehicle 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.81229 0.18771 
 No Army Combat Vehicle 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.81229 0.18771 
7 Yes Navy Guided Munitions/ 
Missiles 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.85094 0.14906 
 Yes Navy Guided Munitions/ 
Missiles 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.85094 0.14906 
8 No Air Force Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.88925 0.11075 
 No Air Force Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.88925 0.11075 
 No Air Force Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.88925 0.11075 
 No Air Force Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 





























































































 No Air Force Guided Munitions/ 
Missiles 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.88925 0.11075 
 No Air Force Sensor/ Radar/ 
Satellite 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.88925 0.11075 
 No Air Force Space  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.88925 0.11075 
 No Air Force Guided Munitions/ 
Missiles 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.88925 0.11075 
 No Air Force Sensor/ Radar/ 
Satellite 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.88925 0.11075 
 No Air Force Sensor/ Radar/ 
Satellite 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.88925 0.11075 
9 No Navy Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Aircraft/ 
Helicopter 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Guided Munitions/ 
Missiles 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Sensor/ Radar/ 
Satellite 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Ship 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Ship 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Ship 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Ship 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
 No Navy Sensor/ Radar/ 
Satellite 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.92789 0.07211 
10 No Navy Combat Vehicle 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.95887 0.04113 
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